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Abstract
We propose a framework for analyzing classical sampling strategies for estimating the Hamming
weight of a large string from a few sample positions, when applied to a multi-qubit quantum system
instead. The framework shows how to interpret the result of such a strategy and how to define its
accuracy when applied to a quantum system. Furthermore, we show how the accuracy of any strategy
relates to its accuracy in its classical usage, which is well understood for the important examples.
We show the usefulness of our framework by using it to obtain new and simple security proofs for
the following quantum-cryptographic schemes: quantum oblivious-transfer from bit-commitment,
and BB84 quantum-key-distribution.
Keywords: Random sampling, quantum key distribution, quantum oblivious transfer.
1 Introduction
Sampling allows to learn some information on a large population by merely looking at a comparably
small number of individuals. For instance it is possible to predict the outcome of an election with very
good accuracy by analyzing a relatively small subset of all the votes. In this work, we initiate the study
of sampling in a quantum population, where we want to be able to learn information on a large quantum
state by measuring only a small part. Specifically, we investigate the quantum-version of the following
classical sampling problem (and of variants thereof). Given a bit-string q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ {0, 1}n of
length n, the task is to estimate the Hamming weight of q by sampling and looking at only a few positions
within q. This classical sampling problem is well understood. For instance the following particular sam-
pling strategy works well: sample (with or without replacement) a linear number of positions uniformly
at random, and compute an estimate for the Hamming weight of q by scaling the Hamming weight of the
sample accordingly; Hoeffding’s bounds guarantee that the estimate is close to the real Hamming weight
except with small probability. Such a sampling strategy in particular allows to test whether q is close to
the all-zero string (0, . . . , 0) by looking only at a relatively small number of positions, where the test is
accepted if and only if all the sample positions are zero, i.e., the estimated Hamming weight vanishes.
In the quantum version of the above sampling problem, the string q is replaced by a n-qubit quantum
system A. It is obvious that a sampling strategy from the classical can be applied to the quantum setting
as well: pick a sample of qubit positions within A, measure (in the computational basis) these sample
positions, and compute the estimate as dictated by the sampling strategy from the observed values (i.e.,
typically, scale the Hamming weight of the measured sample appropriately). However, what is a-priori
1
not clear, is how to formally interpret the computed estimate. In the special case of testing closeness
to the all-zero string, one expects that if the measurement of a random sample only produces zeros then
the initial state of A must have been close to the all-zero state |0〉 · · · |0〉. But what is the right way to
measure closeness here? For instance it must allow for states of the form |q〉where q ∈ {0, 1}n has small
Hamming weight, but it must also allow for superpositions with arbitrary states that come with a very
small amplitude. In the general case of a sampling strategy that, in its classical usage, aims at estimating
the Hamming weight (rather that at testing closeness to the all-zero string), it is not even clear what the
estimate actually estimates when the sampling strategy is applied to a n-qubit quantum system, since
we cannot speak of the Hamming weight of a quantum state. Furthermore, how can we quantify in a
meaningful way how accurate a sampling strategy is, and how hard is it to compute (good bounds on) the
accuracy of different sampling strategies, when applied to a quantum population? Finally, a last subtlety
that is inherent to the quantum setting is that the execution of a sampling strategy actually changes the
state of A due to the measurements.
In this work, we present a framework that answers the above questions and allows us to fully under-
stand how a classical sampling strategy behaves when applied to a quantum population, i.e., to a n-qubit
system or, more general, to n copies of an arbitrary “atomic” system. Our framework incorporates the
following. First, we specify an abstract property on the state of A (after the measurements done by the
sampling strategy), with the intended meaning that this is the property one should conclude from the
outcome of the sampling strategy when applied to A. We also demonstrate that this property has use-
ful consequences: specifically, that a suitable measurement will lead to a high-entropy outcome; this is
handy in particular for quantum-cryptographic purposes. Then, we define a meaningful measure, sort of
a “quantum error probability” (although technically speaking it is not a probability), that tells how reli-
able it is to conclude the specified property from the outcome of the sampling strategy. Finally, we show
that for any sampling strategy, the quantum error probability of the strategy, as we define it, is bounded
by the square-root of its classical error probability. This means that in order to understand how well a
sampling strategy performs in the quantum setting, it suffices to analyze it in the classical setting, which
is typically much simpler. Furthermore, for typical sampling strategies, like when picking the sample
uniformly at random, there are well-known good bounds on the classical error probability.
We demonstrate the usefulness of our framework by means of two applications. Our applications do
not constitute actual new results, but they provide new and simple(r) proofs for known results, both in
the area of quantum cryptography. We take this as strong indication for the usefulness of the framework,
and that the framework is likely to prove valuable in other applications as well.
The first application is to quantum oblivious transfer (QOT). It is well known that QOT is not pos-
sible from scratch; however, one can build a secure QOT scheme when given a bit-commitment (BC)
primitive “for free”.1 Like QOT, also QBC is impossible from scratch; nevertheless, the implication from
BC to QOT is interesting from a theoretical point of view, since the corresponding implication does not
hold in the classical setting. The existence of a QOT scheme based on a BC was suggested by Bennett et
al. in 1991 [BBCS92];2 however, no security proof was provided. Mayers and Salvail proved security of
the QOT scheme against a restricted adversary that only performs individual measurements [MS94], and
finally, in 1995, Yao gave a security proof against a general adversary, which is allowed to do fully coher-
ent measurements [Yao95]. However, from today’s perspective, Yao’s proof is still not fully satisfactory:
1We use BC and OT as short-hands of the respective abstract primitives, bit commitment and oblivious transfer, and we
write QBC and QOT for potential schemes implementing the respective primitives in the quantum setting.
2At that time, QBC was thought to be possible, and thus the QOT scheme was claimed to be implementable from scratch.
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it is very technical, without intuition and hard to follow, and it measures the adversary’s information in
terms of “accessible information”, which has proven to be a too weak information measure.
Here, we show how our framework for analyzing sampling strategies in the quantum setting leads to a
conceptually very simple and easy-to-understand security proof for QOT from BC. The proof essentially
works as follows: When considering a purified version of the QOT scheme, the commit-and-open phase
of the QOT scheme can be viewed as executing a specific sampling strategy. From the framework, it
then follows that some crucial piece of information has high entropy from the adversary’s point of view.
The proof is then concluded by applying the privacy amplification theorem. In recent work of the second
author [DFL+09], it is shown that the same kind of analysis is not restricted to QOT but actually applies
to a large class of two-party quantum-cryptographic schemes which are based on a commit-and-open
phase.
The second application we discuss is to quantum key-distribution (QKD). Also here, our framework
allows for a simple and easy-to-understand security proof, namely for the BB84 QKD scheme.3 Similar
to our proof for QOT, we can view the checking phase of the BB84 scheme as executing a specific
sampling strategy (although here some additional non-trivial observation needs to be made). From the
framework, we can then conclude that the raw key has high entropy from the adversary’s point of view,
and again privacy amplification finishes the job.
As for QOT, also QKD schemes initially came without security proofs, and proving QKD schemes
rigorously secure turned out to be an extremely challenging and subtle task. Nowadays, though, the
security of QKD schemes is better understood, and we know of various ways of proving, say, BB84
secure, ranging from Shor and Preskill’s proof based on quantum error-correcting codes to Renner’s
approach using a quantum De Finetti theorem which allows to reduce security against general attacks
to security against the much weaker class of so-called collective attacks. As such, our proof may safely
be viewed as “yet another BB84 QKD proof”. Nevertheless, when compared to other proofs, it has
some nice features: It provides an explicit and easy-to-compute expression for the security of the scheme
(in contrast to most proofs in the literature which merely provide an asymptotic analysis), it does not
require any “symmetrization of the qubits” (e.g. by applying a random permutation) from the protocol,
and it is technically not very involved (e.g. compared to the proofs involving Renner’s quantum De
Finetti theorem). Furthermore, it gives immediately a direct security proof, rather than a reduction to the
security against collective attacks.
2 Notation, Terminology, and Some Tools
Strings and Hamming Weight. Throughout the paper, A denotes some fixed finite alphabet with
0 ∈ A. It is safe to think of A as {0, 1}, but our claims also hold for larger alphabets. For a string
q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ An of arbitrary length n ≥ 0, the Hamming weight of q is defined as the number of
non-zero entries in q: wt(q) :=
∣∣{i ∈ [n] : qi 6= 0}∣∣, where we use [n] as short hand for {1, . . . , n}. We
also use the notion of the relative Hamming weight of q, defined as ω(q) := wt(q)/n. By convention,
the relative Hamming weight of the empty string⊥ is set to ω(⊥) := 0. For a string q=(q1, . . . , qn)∈An
and a subset J ⊂ [n], we write qJ := (qi)i∈J for the restriction of q to the positions i ∈ J .
3Actually, we prove security for an entanglement-based version of BB84, which was first proposed by Ekert, and which
implies security for the original BB84 scheme.
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Random Variables and Hoeffding’s Inequalities. Formally, a random variable is a function X :
Ω → X with the sample space Ω of a probability space (Ω,Pr) as domain, and some arbitrary finite
set X as range. The distribution of X, which we denote as PX , is given by PX(x) = Pr[X = x] =
Pr[{ω ∈ Ω : X(ω)=x}]. The joint distribution of two (or more) random variables X and Y is denoted
by PXY , i.e., PXY (x, y) = Pr[X=x∧ Y =y]. Usually, we leave the probability space (Ω,Pr) implicit,
and understand random variables to be defined by their joint distribution, or by some “experiment” that
uniquely determines their joint distribution. Random variables X and Y are independent if PXY =
PXPY (in the sense that PXY (x, y) = PX(x)PY (y) ∀x ∈ X , y ∈ Y).
We will make extensive use of Hoeffding’s inequalities for random sampling with and without re-
placement, as developed in [Hoe63]. The following theorem summarizes these inequalities, tailored to
our needs.4
Theorem 1 (Hoeffding). Let b ∈ {0, 1}n be a bit string with relative Hamming weight µ = ω(b). Let the
random variables X1,X2, . . . ,Xk be obtained by sampling k random entries from b with replacement,
i.e., the Xi’s are independent and PXi(1) = µ. Furthermore, let the random variables Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk be
obtained by sampling k random entries from b without replacement. Then, for any δ > 0, the random
variables X¯ := 1k
∑
iXi and Y¯ := 1k
∑
i Yi satisfy
Pr
[|Y¯ − µ| ≥ δ] ≤ Pr[|X¯ − µ| ≥ δ] ≤ 2 exp(−2δ2k) .
For the case of sampling without replacement, a slightly sharper bound was found by Serfling [Ser74]:
Pr
[|Y¯ − µ| ≥ δ] ≤ 2 exp(− 2δ2knn−k+1).
In [Ser74], only a one-sided bound is given. We prove in Appendix A that this implies a two-sided bound.
Quantum Systems and States. We assume the reader to be familiar with the basic concepts of quan-
tum information theory; we merely fix some terminology and notation here. A quantum system A is
associated with a complex Hilbert space, H = Cd, its state space. The state of A is given, in the case
of a pure state, by a norm-1 state vector |ϕ〉 ∈ H, respectively, in the case of a mixed state, by a trace-1
positive-semi-definite operator/matrix ρ : H → H. In order to simplify language, we are sometimes a
bit sloppy in distinguishing between a quantum system, its state, and the state vector or density matrix
describing the state. By default, we write HA for the state space of system A, and ρA (respectively |ϕA〉
in case of a pure state) for the state of A.
The state space of a bipartite quantum system AB, consisting of two (or more) subsystems, is given
by HAB = HA ⊗ HB. If the state of AB is given by ρAB then the state of subsystem A, when treated
as a stand-alone system, is given by the partial trace ρA = trB(ρAB), and correspondingly for B.
Measuring a system A in basis {|i〉}i∈I , where {|i〉}i∈I is an orthonormal basis of HA, means applying
the measurement described by the projectors {|i〉〈i|}i∈I , such that outcome i ∈ I is observed with
probability pi = tr(|i〉〈i|ρA) (respectively pi = |〈i|ϕA〉|2 in case of a pure state). If A is a subsystem of a
bipartite system AB, then it means applying the measurement described by the projectors {|i〉〈i|⊗IB}i∈I ,
where IB is the identity operator on HB.
A qubit is a quantum system A with state space HA = C2. The computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} (for
a qubit) is given by |0〉 = (10) and |1〉 = (01), and the Hadamard basis by H{|0〉, |1〉} = {H|0〉,H|1〉},
4Interestingly, the inequality with respect to random sampling without replacement does not seem to be very commonly
known.
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where H denotes the 2-dimensional Hadamard matrix H = 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
. The state space of an n-qubit
system A = A1 · · ·An is given by HA = (C2)⊗n = C2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ C2. For x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) in {0, 1}n , we write |x〉 for |x〉 = |x1〉 · · · |xn〉 and Hθ for Hθ = Hθ1⊗· · ·⊗Hθn , and
thus Hθ|x〉 for Hθ|x〉 = Hθ1 |x1〉 · · ·Hθn |xn〉. Finally, we write {|0〉, |1〉}⊗n = {|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n}
for the computational basis on an n-qubit system, and Hθ{|0〉, |1〉}⊗n = {Hθ|x〉 : x ∈ {0, 1}n} =
Hθ1{|0〉, |1〉} ⊗ · · · ⊗ Hθn{|0〉, |1〉} for the basis that is made up of the computational basis on the
subsystems Ai with θi = 0 and of the Hadamard basis on the subsystems Ai with θi = 1. In order to
simplify notation, we will sometimes abuse terminology and speak of the basis θ when we actually mean
Hθ{|0〉, |1〉}⊗n .
We measure closeness of two states ρ and σ by their trace distance: ∆(ρ, σ) := 12tr|ρ − σ|, where
for any square matrix M , |M | denotes the positive-semi-definite square-root of M †M . For pure states
|ϕ〉 and |ψ〉, the trace distance of the corresponding density matrices coincides with ∆(|ϕ〉〈ϕ|, |ψ〉〈ψ|) =√
1− |〈ϕ|ψ〉|2. If the states of two systems A and B are ǫ-close, i.e. ∆(ρA, ρB) ≤ ǫ, then A and B
cannot be distinguished with advantage greater than ǫ; in other words, A behaves exactly like B, except
with probability ǫ.
Classical and Hybrid Systems (and States). Subsystem X of a bipartite quantum system XE is
called classical, if the state of XE is given by a density matrix of the form
ρXE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE ,
where X is a finite set of cardinality |X | = dim(HX), PX : X → [0, 1] is a probability distribution,
{|x〉}x∈X is some fixed orthonormal basis of HX , and ρxE is a density matrix on HE for every x ∈ X .
Such a state, called hybrid or cq- (for classical-quantum) state, can equivalently be understood as consist-
ing of a random variable X with distribution PX , taking on values in X , and a system E that is in state
ρxE exactly when X takes on the value x. This formalism naturally extends to two (or more) classical
systems X, Y etc.
If the state of XE satisfies ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE , where ρX = trE(ρXE) =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| and
ρE = trX(ρXE) =
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E , then X is independent of E, and thus no information on X can
be obtained from system E. Moreover, if ρXE = 1|X |IX ⊗ ρE , where IX denotes the identity on HX ,
then X is random-and-independent of E. This is what is aimed for in quantum cryptography, when X
represents a classical cryptographic key and E the adversary’s potential quantum information on X.
It is not too hard to see that for two hybrid states ρXE and ρXE′ with the same (distribution of) X,
the trace distance between ρXE and ρXE′ can be computed as ∆(ρXE , ρXE′) =
∑
x PX(x)∆(ρ
x
E , ρ
x
E′).
Min-Entropy and Privacy Amplification. We make use of Renner’s notion of the conditional min-
entropy Hmin (ρXE |E) of a system X conditioned on another system E [Ren05]. Although the notion
makes sense for arbitrary states, we restrict to hybrid states ρXE with classical X. If the hybrid state ρXE
is clear from the context, we may write Hmin (X|E) instead of Hmin (ρXE |E). The formal definition,
given by Hmin (ρXE |E) := supσE max{h ∈ R : 2−h · IX ⊗ σE − ρXE ≥ 0} where the supremum
is over all density matrices σE on HE , is not very relevant to us; we merely rely on some elementary
properties. For instance, the chain rule guarantees that Hmin (X|Y E) ≥ Hmin (XY |E) − log(|Y|) ≥
Hmin (X|E)−log(|Y|) for classical X and Y with respective ranges X and Y , where here and throughout
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the article log denotes the binary logarithm, whereas ln denotes the natural logarithm. Furthermore, it
holds that if E′ is obtained from E by measuring (part of) E, then Hmin (X|E′) ≥ Hmin (X|E).
Finally, we make use of Renner’s privacy amplification theorem [RK05, Ren05], as given below.
Recall that a function g : R × X → {0, 1}ℓ is called a universal (hash) function, if for the random
variable R, uniformly distributed over R, and for any distinct x, y ∈ X : Pr[g(R,x)=g(R, y)] ≤ 2−ℓ.
Theorem 2 (Privacy amplification). Let ρXE be a hybrid state with classical X. Let g : R×X → {0, 1}ℓ
be a universal hash function, and let R be uniformly distributed over R, independent of X and E. Then
K = g(R,X) satisfies
∆
(
ρKRE,
1
|K|IK ⊗ ρRE
) ≤ 1
2
· 2− 12 (Hmin(X|E)−ℓ) .
Informally, Theorem 2 states that if X contains sufficiently more than ℓ bits of entropy when given E,
then ℓ nearly random-and-independent bits can be extracted from X.
3 Sampling in a Classical Population
As a warm-up, and in order to study some useful examples and introduce some convenient notation, we
start with the classical sampling problem, which is rather well-understood.
3.1 Sampling Strategies
Let q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ An be a string of given length n. We consider the problem of estimating the
relative Hamming weight ω(q) by only looking at a substring qt of q, for a small subset t ⊂ [n].5
Actually, we are interested in the equivalent problem of estimating the relative Hamming weight ω(qt¯)
of the remaining string qt¯, where t¯ is the complement t¯ = [n] \ t of t.6 A canonical way to do so
would be to sample a uniformly random subset (say, of a certain small size) of positions, and compute
the relative Hamming weight of the sample as estimate. Very generally, we allow any strategy that picks
a subset t ⊂ [n] according to some probability distribution and computes the estimate for ω(qt¯) as some
(possibly randomized) function of t and qt, i.e., as f(t, qt, s) for a seed s that is sampled according to
some probability distribution. This motivates the following formal definition.
Definition 1 (Sampling strategy). A sampling strategy Ψ consists of a triple (PT , PS , f), where PT is
a distribution over the subsets of [n], PS is a (independent) distribution over a finite set S , and f is a
function
f : {(t, v) : t ⊂ [n],v ∈ A|t|} × S → R.
We stress that a sampling strategy Ψ, as defined here, specifies how to choose the sample subset as well
as how to compute the estimate from the sample (thus a more appropriate but lengthy name would be a
“sample-and-estimate strategy”).
5More generally, we may consider the problem of estimating the Hamming distance of q to some arbitrary reference string
q◦; but this can obviously be done simply by estimating the Hamming weight of q′ = q − q◦.
6The reason for this, as will become clear later, is that in our applications, the sampled positions within q will be discarded,
and thus we will be interested merely in the remaining positions.
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Remark 1. By definition, the choice of the seed s is specified to be independent of t, i.e., PTS =
PTPS . Sometimes, however, it is convenient to allow s to depend on t. We can actually do so without
contradicting Definition 1. Namely, to comply with the independence requirement, we would simply
choose a (typically huge) “container” seed that contains a seed for every possible choice of t, each one
chosen with the corresponding distribution, and it is then part of f ’s task, when given t, to select the seed
that is actually needed out of the container seed.7
A sampling strategy Ψ can obviously also be used to test if q (or actually qt¯) is close to the all-zero string
0 · · · 0: compute the estimate for ω(qt¯) as dictated by Ψ, and accept if the estimate vanishes and else
reject.
We briefly discuss five example sampling strategies. The examples should illustrate the generality of
the definition, and some of the examples will be used later on; however, the reader is free to skip (some
of) them. We start with the canonical example mentioned in the beginning.
Example 1 (Random sampling without replacement).
In random sampling without replacement, k distinct indices i1, . . . , ik within [n] are chosen uniformly at
random, where k is some parameter, and the relative Hamming weight of q{i1,...,ik} is used as estimate
for ω(qt¯). Formally, this sampling strategy is given by Ψ = (PT , PS , f) where PT (t) = 1/
(n
k
)
if |t| = k
and else PT (t) = 0, S = {⊥} and thus PS(⊥) = 1, and f(t, qt,⊥) = f(t, qt) = ω(qt). ⋄
With the second example, we show that also sampling with replacement is captured by our definition.
Example 2 (Random sampling with replacement).
In random sampling with replacement, k indices i1, . . . , ik are chosen independently uniformly at ran-
dom within [n], where k is some parameter, and the relative Hamming weight of the string (qi1 , . . . , qik)
is used as estimate for ω(qt¯). Note that here iℓ may coincide with iℓ′ for ℓ 6= ℓ′, in which case
(qi1 , . . . , qik) is not equal to q{i1,...,ik}. To make this fit into Definition 1, we set t to be {i1, . . . , ik},
and we let f(t, qt, s) be given by ω(qj1 , . . . , qjk), where j1, . . . , jk is determined by the seed s among
all possibilities with {j1, . . . , jk} = t. It is cumbersome and of no importance to us to determine the
correct distributions PT and PS for t and s, respectively; it is sufficient to realize that random sampling
with replacement is captured by Definition 1. ⋄
Next, we sample by picking a uniformly random subset (without restricting its size).
Example 3 (Uniformly random subset sampling).
The sample set t is chosen as a uniformly random subset of [n], and the estimate is computed as the
relative Hamming weight of the sample qt. Formally, PT (t) = 1/2n for any t ⊆ [n], and S = {⊥} and
f(t, qt,⊥) = f(t, qt) = ω(qt). ⋄
As a fourth example, we consider a somewhat unnatural and in some sense non-optimal sampling strat-
egy. This example, though, will be of use in our analysis of quantum oblivious transfer in Section 5.
Example 4 (Random sampling without replacement, using only part of the sample).
This example can be viewed as a composition of Example 1 and 3. Namely, t is chosen as a random
7Alternatively, we could simply drop the independence requirement in Definition 1; however, we feel it is conceptually
easier to think of the seed as being independently chosen.
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subset of fixed size k, as in Example 1, so that PT (t) = 1/
(n
k
)
for t ⊂ [n] with |t| = k. But now, only
part of the sample qt is used to compute the estimate. Namely, the estimate is computed as
f(t, qt, s) = ω(qs).
where the seed s is chosen as a uniformly random subset s of t; i.e., PS(s) = 1/2t for any s ⊆ t. Recall
from Remark 1 that the choice of s is allowed to depend on t. We would like to point out that when we
use Example 4 in Section 5, it is useful that the restriction to the subset s is part of the evaluation of f ,
rather than part of the selection of the sample subset t. ⋄
In the fifth example we consider another somewhat unnatural sampling strategy, which though will be
useful for the QKD proof in Section 6.
Example 5 (Pairwise one-out-of-two sampling, using only part of the sample).
For this example, it is convenient to consider the index set from which the subset t is chosen, to be of the
form [n]×{0, 1}. Namely, we consider the string q ∈ A2n to be indexed by pairs of indices, q = (qij),
where i ∈ [n] and j ∈ {0, 1}; in other words, we consider q to consist of n pairs (qi0, qi1). The subset
t ⊂ [n]×{0, 1} is chosen as t = {(1, j1), . . . , (n, jn)} where every jk is picked independently at random
in {0, 1}. In other words, t selects one element from each pair (qi0, qi1). Furthermore, the estimate for
ω(qt¯) is computed from qt as f(t, qt, s) = ω(qs) where the seed s is a random subset s ⊂ t of size k. ⋄
Example 6 (Pairwise biased one-out-of-two sampling, using only part of the sample).
In this example we consider a similar situation as in Example 5, except that we now construct t by
sampling every jk according to the Bernoulli distribution (p, 1− p). Consequently, we compute the
estimate for ω(qt¯) slightly differently, but we will make this clear in Appendix B.6. ⋄
3.2 The Error Probability
After having introduced the general notion of a sampling strategy, we next want to define a measure
that captures for a given sampling strategy how well it performs, i.e., with what probability the estimate,
f(t, qt, s), is how close to the real value, ω(qt¯). For the definition, it will be convenient to introduce the
following notation. For a given sampling strategy Ψ = (PT , PS , f), consider arbitrary but fixed choices
for the subset t ⊂ [n] and the seed s ∈ S with PT (t) > 0 and PS(s) > 0. Furthermore, fix an arbitrary
δ > 0. Define Bδt,s(Ψ) ⊆ An as
Bδt,s(Ψ) := {b ∈ An : |ω(bt¯)− f(t, bt, s)| < δ} ,
i.e., as the set of all strings q for which the estimate is δ-close to the real value, assuming that subset t and
seed s have been used. To simplify notation, if Ψ is clear from the context, we simply write Bδt,s instead
ofBδt,s(Ψ). By replacing the specific values t and s by the corresponding (independent) random variables
T and S, with distributions PT and PS , respectively, we obtain the random variable BδT,S , whose range
consists of subsets of An. By means of this random variable, we now define the error probability of a
sampling strategy as follows.
Definition 2 (Error probability). The (classical) error probability of a sampling strategy Ψ = (PT , PS , f)
is defined as the following value, parametrized by 0 < δ < 1:
εδclass(Ψ) := max
q∈An
Pr
[
q /∈ BδT,S(Ψ)
]
.
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By definition of the error probability, it is guaranteed that for any string q ∈ An, the estimated value is
δ-close to the real value except with probability at most εδclass(Ψ). When used as a sampling strategy to
test closeness to the all-zero string, εδclass(Ψ) determines the probability of accepting even though qt¯ is
“not close” to the all-zero string, in the sense that its relative Hamming weight exceeds δ. Whenever Ψ
is clear from the context, we will write εδclass instead of εδclass(Ψ).
In Appendix B, we analyze the error probabilities for the sampling strategies considered in Examples
1 to 5, excluding Example 2, and we show them all to be exponentially small by applying Hoeffding’s
inequality in a suitable way.
4 Sampling in a Quantum Population
We now want to study the behavior of a sampling strategy when applied to a quantum population. More
specifically, let A = A1 · · ·An be an n-partite quantum system, where the state space of each system Ai
equals HAi = Cd with d = |A|, and let {|a〉}a∈A be a fixed orthonormal basis of Cd. We allow A to
be entangled with some additional system E with arbitrary finite-dimensional state-space HE . We may
assume the joint state of AE to be pure, and as such be given by a state vector |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HE; if
not, then it can be purified by increasing the dimension of HE .
Similar to the classical sampling problem of testing closeness to the all-zero string, we can consider
here the problem of testing if the state of A is close to the all-zero reference state |ϕ◦A〉 = |0〉 · · · |0〉 by
looking at, which here means measuring, only a few of the subsystems of A. More generally, we will
be interested in the sampling problem of estimating the “Hamming weight of the state of A”, although it
is not clear at the moment what this should mean. Actually, like in the classical case, we are interested
in testing closeness to the all-zero state, respectively estimating the Hamming weight, of the remaining
subsystems of A.
It is obvious that a sampling strategy Ψ = (PT , PS , f) can be applied in a straightforward way to the
setting at hand: sample t according to PT , measure the subsystems Ai with i ∈ t in basis {|a〉}a∈A to
observe qt ∈ A|t|, and compute the estimate as f(t, qt, s) for s chosen according to PS (respectively, for
testing closeness to the all-zero state, accept or reject depending on the value of the estimate). However,
it is a-priori not clear, how to interpret the outcome. Measuring a random subset of the subsystems of A
and observing 0 all the time indeed seems to suggest that the original state of A, and thus the remaining
subsystems, must be in some sense close to the all-zero state; but what is the right way to formalize this?
In the case of a general sampling strategy for estimating the (relative) Hamming weight, what does the
estimate actually estimate? And, do all strategies that perform well in the classical setting also perform
well in the quantum setting?
We give in this section a rigorous analysis of sampling strategies when applied to a n-partite quan-
tum system A. Our analysis completely answers above concerns. Later in the paper, we demonstrate
the usefulness of our analysis of sampling strategies for studying and analyzing quantum-cryptographic
schemes.
4.1 Analyzing Sampling Strategies in the Quantum Setting
We start by suggesting the property on the remaining subsystems of A that one should expect to be able
to conclude from the outcome of a sampling strategy. A somewhat natural approach is as follows.
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Definition 3. For system AE, and similarly for any subsystem of A, we say that the state |ϕAE〉 of
AE has relative Hamming weight β within A if it is of the form |ϕAE〉 = |b〉|ϕE〉 with b ∈ An and
ω(b) = β.
Now, given the outcome f(t, qt, s) of a sampling strategy when applied to A, we want to be able to
conclude that, up to a small error, the state of the remaining subsystem At¯E is a superposition of states
with relative Hamming weight close to f(t, qt, s) within At¯. To analyze this, we extend some of the
notions introduced in the classical setting. Recall the definition of Bδt,s, consisting of all strings b ∈ An
with |ω(bt¯)− f(t, bt, s)| < δ. By slightly abusing notation, we extend this notion to the quantum setting
and write
span
(
Bδt,s
)
:= span
({|b〉 : b ∈ Bδt,s}) = span({|b〉 : |ω(bt¯)− f(t, bt, s)| < δ}) .
Note that if the state |ϕAE〉 of AE happens to be in span(Bδt,s) ⊗ HE for some t and s, and if exactly
these t and s are chosen when applying the sampling strategy to A, then with certainty the state of At¯E
(after the measurement) is in a superposition of states with relative Hamming weight δ-close to f(t, qt, s)
within At¯, regardless of the measurement outcome qt.
Next, we want to extend the notion of error probability (Definition 2) to the quantum setting. The
following approach turns out to be fruitful. We consider the hybrid system TSAE, consisting of the
classical random variables T and S with distribution PTS = PTPS , describing the choices of t and s,
respectively, and of the actual quantum systems A and E. The state of TSAE is given by
ρTSAE =
∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)|t, s〉〈t, s| ⊗ |ϕAE〉〈ϕAE | .
Note that TS is independent of AE: ρTSAE = ρTS ⊗ ρAE; indeed, in a sampling strategy t and s are
chosen independently of the state of AE. We compare this real state of TSAE with an ideal state which
is of the form
ρ˜TSAE =
∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)|t, s〉〈t, s| ⊗ |ϕ˜tsAE〉〈ϕ˜tsAE | with |ϕ˜tsAE〉 ∈ span(Bδt,s)⊗HE ∀ t, s (1)
for some given δ > 0. Thus, T and S have the same distribution as in the real state, but here we allow
AE to depend on T and S, and for each particular choice t and s for T and S, respectively, we require
the state of AE to be in span(Bδt,s) ⊗ HE . Thus, in an “ideal world” where the state of the hybrid
system TSAE is given by ρ˜TSAE , it holds with certainty that the state |ψAt¯E〉 of At¯E, after having
measured At and having observed qt, is in a superposition of states with relative Hamming weight δ-
close to β := f(t, qt, s) within At¯. We now define the quantum error probability of a sampling strategy
by looking at how far away the closest ideal state ρ˜TSAE is from the real state ρTSAE .
Definition 4 (Quantum error probability). The quantum error probability of a sampling strategy Ψ =
(PT , PS , f) is defined as the following value, parametrized by 0 < δ < 1:
εδquant(Ψ) = maxHE
max
|ϕAE〉
min
ρ˜TSAE
∆(ρTSAE, ρ˜TSAE) ,
where the first max is over all finite-dimensional state spaces HE , the second max is over all state
vectors |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE , and the min is over all ideal states ρ˜TSAE as in (1).8
8It is not too hard to see, in particular after having gained some more insight via the proof of Theorem 3 below, that these
min and max exist.
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As with Bδt,s and εδclass, we simply write εδquant when Ψ is clear from the context. We stress the mean-
ingfulness of the definition: it guarantees that on average over the choice of t and s, the state of At¯E
is εδquant-close to a superposition of states with Hamming weight δ-close to f(t, qt, s) within At¯, and
as such it behaves like a superposition of such states, except with probability εδquant. We will argue be-
low and demonstrate in the subsequent sections that being (close to) a superposition of states with given
approximate (relative) Hamming weight has some useful consequences.
Remark 2. Similarly to footnote 5, also here the results of the section immediately generalize from the
all-zero reference state |0〉 · · · |0〉 to an arbitrary reference state |ϕ◦A〉 of the form |ϕ◦A〉 = U1|0〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗
Un|0〉 for unitary operators Ui acting on Cd. Indeed, the generalization follows simply by a suitable
change of basis, defined by the Ui’s. Or, in the special case where A = {0, 1} and
|ϕ◦A〉 = H θˆ|xˆ〉 = H θˆ1 |xˆ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗H θˆn |xˆn〉
for a fixed reference basis θˆ ∈ {0, 1}n and a fixed reference string xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n, we can, alternatively,
replace in the definitions and results the computational by the Hadamard basis whenever θˆi = 1, and
speak of the (relative) Hamming distance to xˆ rather than of the (relative) Hamming weight.
4.2 The Quantum vs. the Classical Error Probability
It remains to discuss how difficult it is to actually compute the quantum error probability for given
sampling strategies, and how the quantum error probability εδquant relates to the corresponding classical
error probability εδclass. To this end, we show the following simple relationship between εδquant and εδclass.
Theorem 3. For any sampling strategy Ψ and for any δ > 0:
εδquant(Ψ) ≤
√
εδclass(Ψ).
As a consequence of this theorem, it suffices to analyze a sampling strategy in the classical setting,
which is much easier, in order to understand how it behaves in the quantum setting. In particular, sam-
pling strategies that are known to behave well in the classical setting, like examples 1 to 5, are also
automatically guaranteed to behave well in the quantum setting. We will use this in the application
sections.
Our bound on εδquant is in general tight. Indeed, in Appendix D we show tightness for an explicit
class of sampling strategies, which e.g. includes Example 1 and Example 5. Here, we just mention the
tightness result.
Proposition 1. There exist natural sampling strategies for which the inequality in Theorem 3 is an
equality.
Proof of Theorem 3 . We need to show that for any |ϕAE〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE , with arbitrary HE , there exists
a suitable ideal state ρ˜TSAE with ∆(ρTSAE , ρ˜TSAE) ≤ (εδclass)1/2. We construct ρ˜TSAE as in (1), where
the |ϕ˜tsAE〉’s are defined by the following decomposition.
|ϕAE〉 = 〈ϕ˜tsAE |ϕAE〉|ϕ˜tsAE〉+ 〈ϕ˜ts⊥AE |ϕAE〉|ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉,
with |ϕ˜tsAE〉 ∈ span(Bδt,s)⊗HE , |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉 ∈ span(Bδt,s)⊥⊗HE and |〈ϕ˜tsAE |ϕAE〉|2+ |〈ϕ˜ts⊥AE |ϕAE〉|2 = 1.
In other words, |ϕ˜tsAE〉 is obtained as the re-normalized projection of |ϕAE〉 into span(Bδt,s)⊗HE . Note
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that |〈ϕ˜ts⊥AE |ϕAE〉|2 equals the probability Pr
[
Q /∈ Bδt,s
]
, where the random variable Q is obtained by
measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉 in basis {|a〉}⊗na∈A. Furthermore,∑
t,s
PTS(t, s) |〈ϕ˜ts⊥AE |ϕAE〉|2 =
∑
t,s
PTS(t, s) Pr
[
Q /∈Bδt,s
]
= Pr
[
Q /∈BδT,S
]
=
∑
q
PQ(q) Pr
[
q /∈BδT,S
]
,
where by definition of εδclass, the latter is upper bounded by εδclass. From elementary properties of the
trace distance, and using Jensen’s inequality, we can now conclude that
∆
(
ρTSAE, ρ˜TSAE
)
=
∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)∆
(|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |, |ϕ˜tsAE〉〈ϕ˜tsAE |) =∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)
√
1− |〈ϕ˜tsAE |ϕAE〉|2
=
∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)|〈ϕ˜ts⊥AE |ϕAE〉| ≤
√∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)|〈ϕ˜ts⊥AE |ϕAE〉|2 ≤
√
εδclass,
which was to be shown.
As a side remark, we point out that the particular ideal state ρ˜TSAE constructed in the proof mini-
mizes the distance to ρTSAE; this follows from the so-called Hilbert projection theorem.
4.3 Superpositions with a Small Number of Terms
We give here some argument why being (close to) a superposition of states with a given approxi-
mate Hamming weight may be a useful property in the analyses of quantum-cryptographic schemes.
For simplicity, and since this will be the case in our applications, we now restrict to the binary case
where A = {0, 1}. Our argument is based on the following lemma, which follows immediately from
Lemma 3.1.13 in [Ren05]; for completeness, we give a direct proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix C. Infor-
mally, it states that measuring (part of) a superposition of a small number of orthogonal states produces
a similar amount of uncertainty as when measuring the mixture of these orthogonal states.
Lemma 1. LetA and E be arbitrary quantum systems, let {|i〉}i∈I and {|w〉}w∈W be orthonormal bases
of HA, and let |ϕAE〉 and ρmixAE be of the form
|ϕAE〉 =
∑
i∈J
αi|i〉|ϕiE〉 ∈ HA ⊗HE and ρmixAE =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2|i〉〈i| ⊗ |ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |
for some subset J ⊆ I . Furthermore, let ρWE and ρmixWE describe the hybrid systems obtained by
measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉 and ρmixAE , respectively, in basis {|w〉}w∈W to observe outcome W .
Then,
Hmin (ρWE|E) ≥ Hmin
(
ρmixWE|E
)− log |J | .
We apply Lemma 1 to an n-qubit system A where |ϕAE〉 is a superposition of states with relative Ham-
ming weight δ-close to β within A:9
|ϕAE〉 =
∑
b∈{0,1}n
|ω(b)−β|≤δ
|b〉|ϕbE〉 .
9System A considered here corresponds to the subsystem At¯ in the previous section, after having measured At of the ideal
state.
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It is well known that
∣∣{b ∈ {0, 1}n : |ω(b) − β| ≤ δ}∣∣ ≤ ∣∣{b ∈ {0, 1}n : ω(b) ≤ β + δ}∣∣ ≤ 2h(β+δ)n
for β + δ ≤ 12 , where the function h : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is the binary entropy function, defined as h(p) =
−(p log(p) + (1− p) log(1− p)) for 0 < p < 1 and as 0 for p = 0 or 1.10
Since measuring qubits within a state |b〉 in the Hadamard basis produces uniformly random bits, we
can conclude the following.
Corollary 1. Let A be an n-qubit system, let the state |ϕAE〉 of AE be a superposition of states with
relative Hamming weight δ-close to β within A, where δ + β ≤ 12 , and let the random variable X be
obtained by measuring A in basis Hθ{|0〉, |1〉}⊗n for θ ∈ {0, 1}n. Then
Hmin (X |E) ≥ wt(θ)− h(β + δ)n .
Consider now the following quantum-cryptographic setting. Bob prepares and hands over to Alice an
n-qubit quantum system A, which ought to be in state |ϕ◦A〉 = |0〉 · · · |0〉. However, since Bob might
be dishonest, the state of A could be anything, even entangled with some system E controlled by Bob.
Our results now imply the following: Alice can apply a suitable sampling strategy to convince herself
that the joint state of the remaining subsystem of A and of E is (close to) a superposition of states with
bounded relative Hamming weight. From Corollary 1, we can then conclude that with respect to the min-
entropy of the measurement outcome, the state of A behaves similarly to the case where Bob honestly
prepares A to be in state |ϕ◦A〉. By Remark 2, i.e., by doing a suitable change of basis, the same holds
if |ϕ◦A〉 = H θˆ|xˆ〉 for arbitrary fixed θˆ, xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n, where wt(θ) is replaced by the Hamming distance
between θ and θˆ. We will make use of this in the applications in the upcoming sections.
5 Application I: Quantum Oblivious Transfer (QOT)
5.1 The Bennett et al. QOT Scheme
In a (one-out-of-two) oblivious transfer, OT for short, Alice sends two messages, m0,m1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ to
Bob. Bob may choose to receive one of the two message, mc. The security requirements demand that
Bob learns no information on the other message, m1−c, while at the same time Alice remains ignorant
about Bob’s choice bit c.
Back in 1992, Bennett et al. proposed a quantum scheme for OT, i.e., a QOT scheme [BBCS92].
The scheme makes use of a bit commitment (BC), which at that point in time was believed to be imple-
mentable with unconditional security by a quantum scheme. Bennett et al., however, merely claimed
security of their scheme without providing any proof. In 1994, Mayers and Salvail proved the QOT
scheme secure against a limited class of attacks [MS94], and, subsequently, Yao presented a full security
proof without limiting the adversary’s capabilities [Yao95]. However, Yao’s proof is lengthy and very
technical, and thus hard to understand. Furthermore, security is phrased and proven in terms of accessi-
ble information, of which we now know that it is a too weak information measure to guarantee security
as required.
Here we show how our sampling-strategy framework naturally leads to a new security proof for
Bennett et al.’s QOT scheme. The new proof is simple and conceptually easy-to-understand, and security
is expressed and proven by means of a security definition that is currently accepted to be “the right one”.
10There exists a corresponding upper bound for the cardinality of a q-ary Hamming ball (with arbitrary q), expressed in terms
of the so-called q-ary entropy function; we do not elaborate on this here, since we now focus on the binary case.
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Furthermore, it allows for an explicit bound on the imperfection of the scheme for any set of parameters
(number of transmitted qubits, length of messages etc.), rather than merely providing an asymptotic
security claim. Nowadays, we of course know that BC (as well as QOT) cannot be implemented with
unconditional security by means of a quantum scheme: QBC is impossible [May97, LC97]. As such
QOT cannot be instantiated from scratch. Nevertheless, the existence of a QOT scheme based on a
(hypothetical) BC is still an interesting result, since in the non-quantum world, a BC alone does not
allow to implement OT.
Below, we describe Bennett et al.’s QOT scheme (with some minor modifications), which we denote
as QOT. Actually, QOT corresponds to the randomized OT used within Bennett et al.’s QOT scheme,
where the messages m0 andm1, called k0 and k1 in QOT, are not input by Alice (her input is empty: ⊥)
but randomly produced during the course of the scheme and then output to Alice. The desired non-
randomized OT is then obtained simply by one-time-pad encrypting Alice’s input messages m0 andm1
with the keys k0 and k1, respectively. Security of the non-randomized OT follows immediately from the
security of the randomized OT by the properties of the one-time-pad.
QOT is parametrized by parameters n, k, ℓ ∈ N, where n is the number of qubits communicated, ℓ the
bit-length of the messages/keys k0,k1, and k is the size of the “test set” t, which we require to be at most
n/2. QOT makes use of a universal hash function g : R×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}ℓ . For x′ ∈ {0, 1}n′ with n′ <
n, we define g(r,x′) as g(r,x) where x ∈ {0, 1}n is obtained from x′ by padding it with sufficiently
many 0’s. Furthermore, the scheme makes use of a BC, which we assume to be an ideal BC functionality.
Alternatively, at the cost of losing unconditional security against dishonest Alice, we may use a BC
implementation that is perfectly binding and computationally hiding.11 Finally, for simplicity, we assume
a noise-free quantum channel. For the more realistic setting of noisy quantum communication, an error-
correcting code can be applied in a similar fashion as in the original scheme; this will not significantly
affect our proof. In the upcoming protocol12 descriptions, we make use of our convention to speak
about a basis θ (or θˆ ) in {0, 1}n when we actually mean Hθ{|0〉, |1〉}⊗n (respectively H θˆ{|0〉, |1〉}⊗n).
Protocol QOT is shown below.
It is trivial to see that for honest Alice and Bob: kˆc = kc. Furthermore, security against dishonest Alice,
who is trying to learn information on c, is easy to see and not the issue here: in case of a perfect BC
functionality, Alice learns no information on c no matter what she does; in case of a computationally
hiding BC implementation, all information she obtains on c is “hidden within the commitments”, and
thus computational security follows from the computational hiding property.
Proving security against dishonest Bob is much more subtle, and is the goal of this section. Clearly,
if Bob indeed measures the qubits in the preparation phase with respect to some choice θˆ, then security is
easy to see: no matter how he partitions t¯ into I0 and I1, on at least one of xI0 and xI1 he has some lower
bounded uncertainty, and privacy amplification finishes the job. The intuition is now that the commitment
phase forces Bob to essentially measure all qubits with respect to some choice θˆ, as otherwise he will
get caught. However, proving this rigorously is non-trivial.
11Note that we do not claim any kind of composability for this computational setting. In case of a perfectly hiding and
computationally binding BC scheme, our techniques do not apply directly. A specific variant of the latter case (in which the BC
is required to have some additional properties) is handled in [DFL+09].
12A protocol is an interactive algorithm between two (or in general more) entities, whereas a scheme in general may consist
of several protocols (like for BC); since the cryptographic tasks considered in this article (QOT and QKD) ask for a single
protocol, we use the terms protocol and scheme interchangeably.
14
Protocol QOT(⊥; c)
1. (Preparation) Alice chooses x,θ ∈ {0, 1}n at random and sends the n qubits Hθ|x〉 to Bob. Bob
selects θˆ ∈ {0, 1}n at random and measures the received qubits in basis θˆ, obtaining xˆ ∈ {0, 1}n.
2. (Commitment) Bob commits bit-wise to θˆ and xˆ. Alice samples a random subset t ⊂ [n] of
cardinality k and asks Bob to open the commitments to θˆi and xˆi for all i ∈ t. Alice verifies
the opened commitments by checking that xˆi = xi whenever θˆi = θi. She internally stores the
outcome of this check, i.e. accept or reject, for later use in step 4.
3. (Set partitioning) Alice sends θ to Bob. Bob partitions t¯ into the subsets Ic = {i ∈ t¯ : θi = θˆi}
and I1−c = {i ∈ t¯ : θi 6= θˆi} and sends I0 and I1 to Alice.
4. (Key extraction) Alice chooses a random r ∈ R and sends it to Bob. Bob computes kˆc = g(r, xˆIc).
In case of accept, Alice computes k0 and k1 as k0 := g(r,xI0) and k1 := g(r,xI1). Otherwise,
i.e. in case of reject, she sets k0 and k1 to random ℓ-bit strings.
5.2 The Security Proof
For our proof of security against dishonest Bob, we first introduce a slightly modified version of the
protocol, QOT*, given below. QOT* is only of proof-technical interest because it asks Alice to perform
some actions that she could not do in practice. However, her actions are well-defined, and it follows
from standard arguments that Bob’s view of QOT is exactly the same as of QOT*. It thus suffices to prove
security (against dishonest Bob) for QOT*.
QOT* is obtained from QOT by means of the following two modifications. First, for every i ∈ [n],
instead of sending Hθi |xi〉, Alice prepares an EPR pair AiBi of which she sends Bi to Bob and measures
Ai, at some later point in the protocol, in basis θi to obtain xi. By elementary properties of EPR pairs, and
since actions on different subsystems commute, this does not affect Bob’s view of the protocol. Second,
Alice measures her qubits At within the test subset t in Bob’s basis θˆt (rather than in θt) to obtain xt,
but she still only verifies correctness of Bob’s xˆi’s with i ∈ t for which θˆi = θi. Note that by assumption
on the BC, the string θˆ to which Bob can open his commitments is uniquely determined at this point, and
thus Alice’s action is well-defined, although not doable in real life. This modification only influences
Alice’s bits xi for which i ∈ t and θˆi 6= θi; however, since these bits are not used in the protocol, it has
no effect on Bob’s view.
Our proof for the security of QOT*, and thus of QOT, against dishonest Bob follows quite easily from
our treatment of sampling strategies from Section 4. The proof is given below, after the formal security
statement in Theorem 4. We would like to point out that our security guarantee against dishonest Bob
implies the security definition proposed and studied in [FS08] for (randomized) OT, which in particular
implies sequential composability when used as a sub-routine in a classical outer protocol. Note that we
do not claim any kind of composability here against dishonest Alice, although when using an ideal BC,
sequential composability against dishonest Alice can be proven along similar lines as for QOT in the
bounded quantum storage model (see e.g. the arXiv version of [DFR+07]).
Theorem 4 (Security of QOT). Consider an execution of QOT (respectively QOT*) between honest Alice
and dishonest Bob. Let K0 and K1 be the keys in {0, 1}ℓ output by Alice. Then, there exists a bit c so
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Protocol QOT*(⊥; c)
1. (Preparation) Alice prepares n EPR pairs of the form (|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉)/√2, and sends one qubit
of each pair to Bob, who proceeds as in the original scheme QOT to obtain θˆ and xˆ. Alice chooses
a random θ ∈ {0, 1}n, but she does not measure her qubits yet.
2. (Commitment) Bob commits to θˆ and xˆ, and Alice chooses a random subset t ⊂ [n] of cardinality
k, as in QOT. Next, Alice measures her qubits that are indexed by t in Bob’s basis θˆt to obtain xt.
Then, Alice sends t to Bob and they proceed as in QOT, meaning that Bob opens these commitments
and Alice verifies them.
3. (Set partitioning) As in QOT. Additionally, Alice measures her qubits corresponding to I0 in basis
θI0 to obtain xI0 and her qubits corresponding to I1 in basis θI1 to obtain xI1 .
4. (Key extraction) Exactly as in the original scheme QOT.
that K1−c is close to random-and-independent of Bob’s view (given Kc) in that for any ǫ, δ > 0:
∆
(
ρK1−cKcE,
1
2ℓ
I⊗ ρKcE
)
≤ 1
2
· 2− 12
((
1
4
− ǫ
2
−h(δ)
)
(n−k)−ℓ
)
+
√
6 exp
(−δ2k/100) + 2exp(−2ǫ2(n− k)),
where E denotes the quantum state output by Bob, and I the identity operator on C2ℓ .
On a high level, the proof is as follows. Alice’s checking procedure can be understood as applying a
sampling strategy to the qubits she holds. From this we obtain that (except with a small error) the joint
state she shares with Bob is a superposition of states with small relative Hamming weight within her
subsystem At¯. This implies that the joint state is a superposition of states with small relative Hamming
weight also within AI1−c , where c ∈ {0, 1} is chosen such that θi 6= θˆi for approximately half (or more)
of the indices i in I1−c. It then follows from Corollary 1 that xI1−c , obtained by measuring AI1−c in
basis θI1−c , has high min-entropy, so that privacy amplification concludes the proof. The formal proof,
which takes care of the details and keeps track of the error term, is given below.
Proof. We consider the state
|ϕAE◦〉 ∈ HA1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ HAn ⊗HE◦ ,
shared between Alice and Bob, after Bob has committed to θˆ and xˆ, but before Alice chooses the test
subset t. |ϕAE◦〉 is obtained from the n EPR-pairs by an arbitrary quantum operation (possibly involving
measurements), applied only to Bob’s part. Without loss of generality, we may assume that, given the
commitments, the joint state is indeed pure. Furthermore, we consider the strings θˆ and xˆ, to which
Bob has committed. By the perfectly binding property, these are uniquely determined. For concreteness,
and in order to have the notation fit nicely with Section 4, we assume θˆ = xˆ = (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}n;
however, by Remark 2, the very same reasoning works for any θˆ and xˆ.
The crucial observation now is that Alice’s checking procedure within the commitment phase of
QOT* can be understood as applying a sampling strategy to the state |ϕAE◦〉 in order to test closeness
of A to the all-zero state |0〉 · · · |0〉. Indeed, Alice chooses a random subset t ⊂ [n] of cardinality k,
measures At (in the computational basis) to obtain xt, and decides whether to accept or reject based on
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xt; specifically, she takes a random subset s ⊆ t, given by s = {i ∈ t : θi = θˆi}, and accepts if and
only xs = 0 for all i ∈ s. This is precisely the sampling strategy Ψ studied in Example 4, adapted to test
closeness to |0〉 · · · |0〉 by accepting if and only if f(t,xt, s) = 0. Note that, by the random choices of
the θi’s, s is indeed a random subset of t.
Thus, we can conclude that at the end of the commitment phase, for any fixed δ > 0, the joint state
of At¯E◦ has collapsed to a state |ψAt¯E◦〉 that is (on average over Alice’s choice of t and s) εδquant-close
to being a superposition of states with relative Hamming weight at most δ within At¯ (except when Alice
rejects the test, but in that case she will output random and independent keys at the end of the protocol
and the theorem trivially holds). We proceed by assuming that the state |ψAt¯E◦〉 equals a superposition
of states with small relative Hamming weight, and we book-keep the error εδquant.13 Recall that by
Theorem 3 and Example 4 (and its analysis in Appendix B.4),
εδquant ≤
√
εδclass ≤
√
6 exp
(−kδ2/100) .
By the random choices of the θi’s, it follows from Hoeffding’s inequality (Theorem 1) that the
Hamming weight of θt¯ is lower bounded by wt(θt¯) ≥ (12 − ǫ)(n − k) except with probability at
most 2 exp(−2ǫ2(n− k)).14 In the sequel, we assume that the bound holds, and we book-keep the
error. It follows that regardless of how Bob divides t¯ into I0 and I1, there exists c ∈ {0, 1} such that
wt(θI1−c) ≥ 12(12 − ǫ)(n− k) (if Bob is honest, then c coincides with his input bit).
By re-arranging Alice’s qubits, we write the state |ψAt¯E◦〉 as |ψA1−cAcE◦〉, where A0 := AI0 and
A1 := AI1 . Since |ψAt¯E◦〉 is a superposition of states with Hamming weight at most (n − k)δ within
At, it is easy to see that |ψA1−cAcE◦〉 is a superposition of states with Hamming weight at most (n− k)δ
within A1−c. Let the random variables X1−c andXc describe the outcome of measuring A1−c and Ac in
bases θI1−c and θIc , respectively, and let ρX1−cXcE◦ be the corresponding hybrid state. We may think
of ρX1−cXcE◦ being obtained by first measuring A1−c, resulting in a hybrid state ρX1−cAcE◦ , and then
measuring Ac; indeed, the order in which these measurements take place have no effect on the final state.
We can now apply Corollary 1 to the hybrid state ρX1−cAcE◦ obtained from measuring subsystem
A1−c within |ψA1−cAcE◦〉 and conclude that
Hmin (X1−c|AcE◦) ≥ wt(θI1−c)− h(δ) · |I1−c| ≥
(1
4
− ǫ
2
− h(δ)
)
(n− k) .
By a basic property of the min-entropy (“measuring only destroys information”), it follows that the
same bound in particular holds for Hmin (X1−c|XcE◦). Applying privacy amplification (Theorem 2),
incorporating the error-probabilities (expressed in terms of trace distance) obtained along the proof, and
noting that Bob’s processing of his information to obtain his final quantum state E does not increase the
trace-distance, concludes the proof.
6 Application II: Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
In quantum key distribution (QKD), Alice and Bob want to agree on a secret key in the presence of an
adversary Eve. Alice and Bob are assumed to be able to communicate over a quantum channel and over
13It now follows immediately from Corollary 1 that Hmin(X0X1|E◦) is “large”, where X0 collects the bits obtained by
measuring AI0 in basis θI0 , and correspondingly for X1. However, in the end we need that Hmin(X1−c|XcE◦) is “large” for
some c, which does not follow from the former. Because of that, we need to make a small detour.
14Actually, for the one-sided bound, we could save the factor two in front of the exp.
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an authenticated classical channel.15 Eve may eavesdrop the classical channel (but not insert or modify
messages), and she has full control over the quantum channel. The first and still most prominent QKD
scheme is the famous BB84 QKD scheme due to Bennett and Brassard [BB84].
In this section, we show how our sampling-strategy framework leads to a simple security proof for
the BB84 QKD scheme. Proving QKD schemes rigorously secure is a highly non-trivial task, and as
such our new proof nicely demonstrates the power of the sampling-strategy framework. Furthermore,
our new proof has some nice features. For instance, it allows us to explicitly state (a bound on) the error
probability of the QKD scheme for any given choices of the parameters. Additionally, our proof does not
seem to take unnecessary detours or to make use of “loose bounds”, and therefore we feel that the bound
on the error probability we obtain is rather tight (although we have no formal argument to support this).
Our proof strategy can also be applied to other QKD schemes that are based on the BB84 encoding.
For example, Lo et al.’s QKD scheme16 [LCA05] can be proven secure by following exactly our proof,
except that one needs to analyze a slightly different sampling strategy, namely the one from Example 6.
On the other hand, it is yet unknown whether our framework can be used to prove e.g. the six-state QKD
protocol [Bru98] secure.
Actually, the QKD scheme we analyze is the entanglement-based version of the BB84 scheme (as
initially suggested by Ekert [Eke91]). However, it is very well known and not too hard to show that
security of the entanglement-based version implies security of the original BB84 QKD scheme.
The entanglement-based QKD scheme, QKD, is parametrized by the total number n of qubits sent in
the protocol and the number k of qubits used to estimate the error rate of the quantum channel (where we
require k ≤ n/2). Additional parameters, which are determined during the course of the protocol, are
the observed error rate β and the number ℓ ∈ N∪{0} of extracted key bits. QKD makes use of a universal
hash function g : R × {0, 1}n−k → {0, 1}ℓ and a linear binary error correcting code of length n − k
that allows to correct up to a β′-fraction of errors (except maybe with negligible probability) for some
β′ > β. The choice of how much β′ exceeds β is a trade-off between keeping the probability that Alice
and Bob end up with different keys small and increasing the size of the extractable key. We will write m
for the bit size of the syndrome of this error-correcting code. Protocol QKD can be found below.
It is not hard to see that k = kˆ except with negligible probability (in n). Furthermore, if no Eve
interacts with the quantum communication in the qubit distribution phase then x = y in case of a noise-
free quantum channel, or more generally, ω(x − y) ≈ φ in case the quantum channel is noisy and
introduces an error probability 0 ≤ φ < 12 . It follows that β ≈ φ, so that using an error correcting
code that approaches the Shannon bound, Alice and Bob can extract close to (1− 2h(φ))(n − k) bits of
secret key, which is positive for φ smaller than approximately 11%. The difficult part is to prove security
against an active adversary Eve. We first state the formal security claim.
Note that we cannot expect that Eve has (nearly) no information onK, i.e. that ∆(ρKE , 1|K|IK⊗ρE)
is small, since the bit-length ℓ of K is not fixed but depends on the course of the protocol, and Eve can
influence and thus obtain information on ℓ (and thus on K). Theorem 5 though guarantees that the
bit-length ℓ is the only information Eve learns on K, in other words, K is essentially random-and-
independent of E when given ℓ.
15If the classical channel between Alice and Bob is not authentic, then authenticity of the communication can still be achieved
by information-theoretic authentication techniques, at the cost of requiring Alice and Bob to initially share a short secret key.
16In this scheme, Alice and Bob bias the choice of the bases so that they measure a bigger fraction of the qubits in the same
basis.
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Protocol QKD
1. (Qubit distribution) Alice prepares n EPR pairs of the form (|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉)/√2, and sends one
qubit of each pair to Bob, who confirms the receipt of the qubits. Then, Alice picks random
θ ∈ {0, 1}n and sends it to Bob, and Alice and Bob measure their respective qubits in basis θ to
obtain x on Alice’s side respectively y on Bob’s side.
2. (Error estimation) Alice chooses a random subset s ⊂ [n] of size k and sends it to Bob. Then,
Alice and Bob exchange xs and ys and compute β := ω(xs ⊕ ys).
3. (Error correction) Alice sends the syndrome syn of xs¯ to Bob with respect to a suitable linear
error correcting code (as described above). Bob uses syn to correct the errors in ys¯ and obtains
xˆs¯. Let m be the bit-size of syn.
4. (Key distillation) Alice chooses a random seed r for a universal hash function g with range {0, 1}ℓ,
where ℓ satisfies ℓ < (1−h(β))n − k − m (or ℓ = 0 if the right-hand side is not positive), and
sends it to Bob. Then, Alice and Bob compute k := g(r,xs¯) and kˆ := g(r, xˆs¯), respectively.
Theorem 5 (Security of QKD). Consider an execution of QKD in the presence of an adversary Eve. Let
K be the key obtained by Alice, and let E be Eve’s quantum system at the end of the protocol. Let K˜ be
chosen uniformly at random of the same bit-length as K. Then, for any δ with β + δ ≤ 12 :
∆
(
ρKE , ρK˜E
) ≤ 1
2
· 2− 12
((
1−h(β+δ)
)
n−k−m−ℓ
)
+ 2exp
(−16δ2k) .
From an application point of view, the following question is of interest. Given the parameters n and
k, and given a course of the protocol with observed error rate β and where an error-correcting code
with syndrome length m was used, what is the maximal size ℓ of the extractable key K if we want
∆(ρKE , ρK˜E) ≤ ǫ for a given ǫ? From the bound in Theorem 5, it follows that for every choice of δ
(with β + δ ≤ 12 ), one can easily compute a possible value for ℓ simply by solving for ℓ. In order to
compute the optimal value, one needs to maximize ℓ over the choice of δ.
The formal proof of Theorem 5 is given below. Informally, the argument goes as follows. The error
estimation phase can be understood as applying a sampling strategy. From this, we can conclude that
the state from which the raw key, xs¯, is obtained, is a superposition of states with bounded Hamming
weight, so that Corollary 1 guarantees a certain amount of min-entropy within xs¯. Privacy amplification
then finishes the proof.
To indeed be able to model the error estimation procedure as a sampling strategy, we will need to
consider a modified but equivalent way for Alice and Bob to jointly obtain xs and ys from the initial
joint state, which will allow them to obtain the XOR-sum xs ⊕ ys, and thus to compute β, before they
measure the remaining part of the state, whose outcome then determines xs¯. This modification is based
on the so-called CNOT operation, UCNOT, acting on C2 ⊗ C2, and its properties that
UCNOT(|b〉|c〉) = |b〉|b⊕ c〉 and UCNOT(H|b〉H|c〉) = H|b⊕ c〉H|c〉 , (2)
where the first holds by definition of UCNOT, and the second is straightforward to verify.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we use capital letters, Θ, X etc. for the random variables representing
the corresponding choices of θ, x etc. in protocol QKD. Let the state, shared by Alice, Bob and Eve right
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after the quantum communication in the qubit distribution phase, be denoted by |ψABE◦〉;17 without loss
of generality, we may indeed assume the shared state to be pure. For every i ∈ [n], Alice and Bob then
measure the respective qubits Ai and Bi from |ψABE◦〉 in basis Θi, obtaining Xi and Yi. This results
in the hybrid state ρΘXY E◦ . For the proof, it will be convenient to introduce the additional random
variables W = (W1, . . . ,Wn) and Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn), defined by
Zi := Xi ⊕ Yi and Wi :=
{
Xi if Θi = 0
Yi if Θi = 1
. (3)
Note that, when given Θ, the random variables W andZ are uniquely determined byX and Y and vice
versa, and thus we may equivalently analyze the hybrid state ρΘWZE◦ .
For the analysis, we will consider a slightly different experiment for Alice and Bob to obtain the
very same state ρΘWZE◦ ; the advantage of the modified experiment is that it can be understood as a
sampling strategy. The modified experiment is as follows. First, the CNOT transformation is applied to
every qubit pair AiBi within |ψABE◦〉 for i ∈ [n], such that the state |ϕABE◦〉 = (U⊗nCNOT ⊗ IE◦)|ψABE◦〉
is obtained. Next, Θ is chosen at random as in the original scheme, and for every i ∈ [n] the qubit
pair AiBi of the transformed state is measured as in the original scheme depending on Θi; however,
if Θi = 0 then the resulting bits are denoted by Wi and Zi, respectively, and if Θi = 1 then they are
denoted byZi and Wi, respectively, such that which bit is assigned to which variable depends on Θi. This
is illustrated in Figure 1 (left and middle), where light and dark colored ovals represent measurements in
the computational and Hadamard basis, respectively. It now follows immediately from the properties (2)
of the CNOT transformation and from the relation (3) between X,Y and W ,Z that the state ρΘWZE◦
(or, equivalently, ρΘXY E◦) obtained in this modified experiment is exactly the same as in the original.
.
.
.
.
.
.
|ψABE〉
E
Y2
Y3
Y1
Yn
X1
X2
Xn
X3
0
1
1
0
.
.
.
Θ
.
.
.
.
.
.
|ϕABE〉
E
X1 = W1
W2 = Y2
W3 = Y3
Xn =Wn
Z1 = X1⊕Y1
X2⊕Y2 = Z2
X3⊕Y3 = Z3
Zn = Xn⊕Yn
.
.
.
.
.
.
|ϕABE〉
E
Z1 = X1⊕Y1
Zn = Xn⊕Yn
X2⊕Y2 = Z2
X3⊕Y3 = Z3
Figure 1: Original and modified experiments for obtaining the same state ρΘWZE◦ .
An additional modification we may do without influencing the final state is to delay some of the
measurements: we assume that first the qubits are measured that lead to the Zi’s, and only at some later
point, namely after the error estimation phase, the qubits leading to the Wi’s are measured (as illustrated
in Figure 1, right). This can be done since the relative Hamming weight of XS ⊕YS for a random subset
S ⊂ [n] (of size k) can be computed given Z alone.
The crucial observation is now that this modified experiment can be viewed as a particular sampling
strategy Ψ, as a matter of fact as the sampling strategy discussed in Example 5, being applied to systems
A and B of the state |ϕABE◦〉. Indeed: first, a subset of the 2n qubit positions is selected according to
some probability distribution, namely of each pair AiBi one qubit is selected at random (determined by
17Note that E◦ represents Eve’s quantum state just after the quantum communication stage, whereas E represents Eve’s
entire state of knowledge at the end of the protocol (i.e., the quantum information and all classical information gathered during
execution of QKD).
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Θi). Then, the selected qubits are measured to obtain the bit string Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn). And, finally, a
value β is computed as a (randomized) function of Z: β = ω(ZS) for a random S ⊂ [n] of size k. We
point out that here the reference basis (as explained in Remark 2) is not the computational basis for all
qubits, but is the Hadamard basis on the qubits in system A and the computational basis in system B;
however, as discussed in Remark 2, we may still apply the results from Section 4 (appropriately adapted).
It thus follows that for any fixed δ > 0, the remaining state, from which W is then obtained, is (on
average over Θ and S) εδquant-close to a state which is (for any possible values for Θ, Z and S) a super-
position of states with relative Hamming weight in a δ-neighborhood of β. Note that the latter has to be
understood with respect to the fixed reference basis (i.e., the Hadamard basis on A and the computational
basis on B). In the following, we assume that the remaining state equals such a superposition, but we
remember the error
εδquant ≤
√
εδclass ≤ 2 exp
(−16δ2k) .
where the bound on εδclass is derived in Appendix B.5.
Recall that W is now obtained by measuring the remaining qubits; however, the basis used is op-
posite to the reference basis, namely the computational basis on the qubits Ai and the Hadamard basis
on the qubits Bi. Hence, by Corollary 1 (and the subsequent discussion) we get a lower bound on the
min-entropy of W :
Hmin (W |ΘZSE◦) ≥ (1− h(β + δ))n .
Since W is uniquely determined by X (and vice versa) when given Θ and Z, the same lower bound
also holds for Hmin (X|ΘZSE◦). Note that in QKD, the k qubit-pairs that are used for estimating β are
not used anymore in the key distillation phase, so we are actually interested in the min-entropy of XS¯ .
Additionally, we should take into account that Alice sends an m-bit syndrome SYN during the error
correction phase. Hence, by using the chain rule, we obtain
Hmin (XS¯ |ΘZXSSYNE◦) ≥ (1− h(β + δ))n − k −m.18
Finally, we apply privacy amplification (Theorem 2) which concludes the proof.
7 Conclusion
We have shown a framework for predicting some property (namely the approximate Hamming weight,
appropriately defined) of a population of quantum states, by measuring a small sample subset. The
framework allows for new and simple security proofs for important quantum cryptographic protocols:
the Bennett et al. QOT and the BB84 QKD scheme. We find it particularly interesting that with our
framework, the protocols for QOT and QKD can be proven secure by means of very similar techniques,
even though they implement fundamentally different cryptographic primitives, and are intuitively secure
due to very different reasons (namely in QOT the commitments force Bob to measure the communicated
qubits, whereas in QKD Eve disturbs the communicated qubits when trying to observe them).
18Probably, it is possible to prove the lower bound: (1−h(β+δ))(n−k)−m using a different sampling strategy. However,
for that case the error probability of the related classical sampling strategy becomes harder to analyze. We have chosen for the
current proof strategy and bound for the sake of simplicity.
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A A Two-Sided Version of Serfling’s Bound
Let b ∈ {0, 1}n be a bit string with relative Hamming weight µ = ω(b). Let the random variables
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yk be obtained by sampling k random entries from b without replacement. Then, a result by
Serfling [Ser74] says that for any δ > 0, the random variable Y¯ := 1k
∑
i Yi satisfies
Pr[Y¯ − µ > δ] ≤ exp
( −2δ2kn
n− k + 1
)
.
The aim of this section is to prove that the one-sided bound above implies the two-sided bound
Pr[|Y¯ − µ| > δ] ≤ 2 exp
( −2δ2kn
n− k + 1
)
.
Proof.
Pr[|Y¯ − µ| > δ] = Pr[| 1k
∑
i
Yi − µ| > δ]
= Pr[ 1k
∑
i
Yi − µ < −δ] + Pr[ 1k
∑
i
Yi − µ > δ]
= Pr[ 1k
∑
i
(Yi − 1)− (µ − 1) < −δ] + Pr[ 1k
∑
i
Yi − µ > δ]
= Pr[ 1k
∑
i
(1− Yi)− (1− µ) > δ] + Pr[ 1k
∑
i
Yi − µ > δ]
Note that the random variable 1−Yi has mean 1−µ. We can now apply Serfling’s bound twice, yielding
the claim.
B Error Probabilities of the Example Sampling Strategies
B.1 Example 1 — Random sampling without replacement
It follows immediately from Theorem 1 that the estimate is δ-close to the relative Hamming weight
ω(q) of q except with probability at most 2 exp(−2δ2k). However, we want to analyze closeness of the
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estimate to ω(qT¯ ) (still treating T as a random variable). This can be derived easily as follows. We can
write ω(q) = αω(qT ) + (1− α)ω(qT¯ ), where α := k/n, and thus can see that
ω(qT¯ )− ω(qT ) =
1
1− α
(
ω(q)− αω(qT )
)
− ω(qT ) =
1
1− α
(
ω(q)− ω(qT )
)
so that
εδclass = max
q
Pr
[
q /∈ BδT,S
]
= max
q
Pr
[|ω(qT¯ )− ω(qT )| ≥ δ]
= max
q
Pr
[|ω(q)− ω(qT )| ≥ (1−α)δ] ≤ 2 exp(−2(1−α)2δ2k). (4)
Under assumption of k ≤ n/2, we obtain a simple bound for the latter expression,
εδclass ≤ 2 exp
(−2(1−α)2δ2k) ≤ 2 exp(−12δ2k). (5)
We obtain the following bound if we use the bound from [Ser74]:
εδclass = max
q
Pr
[|ω(q)− ω(qT )| ≥ (1−α)δ]
≤ 2 exp(−2(1−α)2δ2knn−k+1 ) = 2exp(−2k(n−k)2δ2n(n−k+1) ) ≤ 2 exp(− δ2knn+2 ).
for k ≤ n/2, because −2k(n−k)2δ2n(n−k+1) is convex in k, and − δ
2kn
2+n is linear in k and equality holds at k = 0
and k = n/2, hence it is a tight linear upper bound.
B.2 Example 2 — Random sampling with replacement
Computing the error probability for Example 2 actually turns out to be tricky. Although, as in Example 1
above, Theorem 1 applies and guarantees that the estimate is likely to be close to ω(q), showing that the
estimate is likely to be close to ω(qT¯ ) seems to be non-trivial here. Since we make no further use of this
example sampling strategy, we refrain from analyzing its error probability.
B.3 Example 3 — Uniformly random subset sampling
Note that for any fixed choice k = |t|, t is obtained as in random sampling without replacement. Because
t is sampled uniformly at random, the expectation of k is given by E[k] = n/2. Hence, by making use
of Hoeffding’s inequality, we can say that for 0 < β < 12 , Pr[| kn − 12 | ≥ β] ≤ 2 exp(−2β2n).
Informally, the idea is to start off with an upper bound on εδclass obtained in Appendix B.1 (the case
of sampling without replacement), and transform it into an upper bound that holds under the assumption
that k ∈ [(12 − β)n, (12 + β)n]. Note that we cannot use the simple bound (5) from Appendix B.1,
because that result was obtained under the assumption that k ≤ n/2, and here this assumption does not
hold. Instead, we use bound (4) from Appendix B.1,
εδclass ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2(1− kn)2δ2k) (6)
which does hold for all k ∈ {0, . . . , n}.
To get an upper bound for (6), we replace the first occurrence of k in that expression (in the numerator
of the fraction) by an upper bound for k, and the second occurrence of k by a lower bound for k.
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The upper and lower bound for k are simply given by the (appropriate) boundary points of the interval
[(12 − β)n, (12 + β)n]. I.e.,
2 exp
(
− 2nδ2
(
1− (
1
2 + β)n
n
)2
(12 − β)
)
= 2exp
(− 2nδ2(12 − β)3)
To compute εδclass, we use a union bound to combine the upper bound above, which holds under assump-
tion that k lies inside the previously defined interval, with the upper bound on the probability that k does
not lie in this interval,
εδclass ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2nδ2(12 − β)3)+ 2exp(−2β2n).
Setting β = δ/4 in the expression above yields −nδ2(2− δ)3/32 for the exponent of the first summand,
and −nδ2/8 for the exponent of the second summand. Because 0 < δ < 1 (Definition 2), a suitable
upper bound for both exponents is −nδ2/32.19 This gives the following simpler bound,
εδclass ≤ 4 exp(−nδ2/32).
B.4 Example 4 — Random sampling without replacement, using only part of the sample
From Appendix B.1, we know that Pr
[|ω(qT¯ )−ω(qT )| ≥ ξ] ≤ 2 exp(−12ξ2k), for k < n/2. Addition-
ally, the selection of the seed s and the computation of f(t, qt, s) can be viewed as applying uniformly
random subset sampling to qt. Hence, it follows from Appendix B.3 that maxq Pr
[|ω(qT )− ω(qS)| ≥
γ
] ≤ 4 exp(−kγ2/32). Setting δ = ξ + γ, and using triangle inequality and union bound, we obtain
εδclass = max
q
Pr
[|ω(qS)− ω(qT¯ )| ≥ δ]
≤ min
0<ξ<δ
[
2 exp
(−12ξ2k)+ 4exp(−k(δ − ξ)2/32)]
≤ 6 exp(−kδ2/50),
where the last inequality follows from setting ξ = δ/5 such that the two exponents coincide.
B.5 Example 5 — Pairwise one-out-of-two sampling, using only part of the sample
ForA = {0, 1}, a bound on the error probability εδclass is obtained as follows. Let q be arbitrary, indexed
as discussed earlier. First, we show that ω(qT¯ ) is likely to be close to ω(qT ). For this, consider the
pairs (qi0, qi1) for which qi0 6= qi1. Let there be ℓ such pairs (where obviously ℓ ≤ n.) We denote the
restrictions of qT and qT¯ to these indices i with qi0 6= qi1 by q˜T and q˜T¯ , respectively. It is easy to see
that wt(q˜T ) + wt(q˜T¯ ) = ℓ. It follows that for any ǫ > 0 we have
Pr
[|ω(qT¯ )− ω(qT )| ≥ ǫ] = Pr[|wt(qT )− wt(qT¯ )| ≥ nǫ]
= Pr
[|wt(q˜T )− wt(q˜T¯ )| ≥ nǫ] = Pr[|2wt(q˜T )− ℓ| ≥ nǫ]
≤ 2 exp
(
−2 (nǫ2ℓ )2 ℓ) = 2exp (−nǫ22 · nℓ ) ≤ 2 exp (−12ǫ2n) ,
19Note that our goal is to find a short and simple expression, rather than finding the tightest bound.
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where the third equality follows from replacing wt(q˜T¯ ) by ℓ− wt(q˜T ), and the first inequality follows
from Hoeffding’s inequality (as each entry of wt(q˜T ) is 0 with independent probability 12 ).
Furthermore, for any γ > 0 we have the following relation involving qS:
Pr
[|ω(qT )− ω(qS)| ≥ γ] ≤ 2 exp (−2kγ2) ,
which follows from directly applying Hoeffding’s inequality. Applying the union bound and letting
δ = ǫ+ γ, we obtain
εδclass = max
q
Pr
[|ω(qT¯ )− ω(qS)| ≥ δ] < 2 min
ǫ∈(0,δ)
[
exp
(−12ǫ2n)+ exp (−2k(δ − ǫ)2)]
≤ 4 exp
(
− 2knδ2
(2
√
k+
√
n)2
)
≤ 4 exp (−13δ2k) ,
where the last line follows from choosing ǫ such that the two exponents coincide, and from doing some
simplifications while assuming k ≤ n/2.
B.6 Example 6 — Pairwise biased one-out-of-two sampling, using only part of the sample
It will be convenient to define the index set t as the union of two subsets, t0 ⊂ [n] × {0} and t1 ⊂
[n]×{1}. Note that the complements of these subsets should now be understood as t¯0 = ([n]×{0})\ t0
and t¯1 = ([n]×{1}) \ t1. Let t0 and t1 be constructed as follows. We first sample a set t˜ ⊂ [n]; for each
element of [n], we include it in t˜ with probability p. Then, t0 := t˜× {0} and t1 := ([n] \ t˜)× {1}. Like
t, the seed s is also defined as the union of two randomly chosen sets, s = s0 ∪ s1, where s0 ⊂ t0 and
s1 ⊂ t1.20 These sets have fixed size; for a parameter k ∈ N, |s0| = k2 and |s1| = k2 . Now, the estimate
for ω(qt¯) is computed as f(t, qt, s) = 1n
(|t¯0| ω(qs0) + |t¯1| ω(qs1)).
We need to show that ω(qT¯ ) is likely to be close to ω(qS). Because we compute an estimate for
ω(qT¯ ) as a function of ω(qS0) and ω(qS1), we will first show that (with high probability) ω(qT0) ≈
ω(qS0) and ω(qT1) ≈ ω(qS1). Then, we argue that ω(qT¯0) ≈ ω(qT0) and ω(qT¯1) ≈ ω(qT1), from
which we can also conclude (using the union bound) that ω(qT¯0) ≈ ω(qS0) and ω(qT¯1) ≈ ω(qS1).
Finally, we apply the union bound again and combine the two bounds to obtain an upper bound for
Pr
[|ω(qT¯ )− 1n(|T¯0| ω(qS0) + |T¯1| ω(qS1))| ≥ δ].
The first step in the proof follows directly from Hoeffding’s inequality,
Pr
[∣∣ω(qT0)− ω(qS0)∣∣ ≥ γ] ≤ 2 exp (−2|S0|γ2) = 2exp(−kγ2), for any γ > 0.
Trivially, this bound also applies to the relation between ω(qT1) and ω(qS1), if we substitute appropri-
ately. The second step, showing that ω(T¯0) (respectively ω(T¯1)) is likely to be close to ω(T0) (resp.
ω(T1)), is slightly more involved. Namely, although the sum of the sizes of T0 and T1 is constant (to
be precise, |T0| + |T1| = n), their individual sizes are random. In Example 3 (see also Appendix B.3),
we have already encountered a similar, though not identical, situation, i.e., Example 3 considers uni-
formly random one-out-of-two sampling whereas here we analyze one-out-of-two sampling according
to a Bernoulli (p, 1−p) distribution. Nonetheless, it is straightforward to generalize the proof of Ap-
pendix B.3 to this (more general) case.
Let X := |T0|. The expectation of X is given by E[X] = np. Let E be the event that X ∈
[(p − β)n, (p + β)n], for β > 0. From Hoeffding’s inequality, we known that Pr[E¯ ] = Pr[|Xn − p| ≥
20Again, Remark 1 applies.
26
β] ≤ 2 exp(−2β2n). Like in Appendix B.3, we find an upper bound that holds conditioned on the event
E , by substituting the boundary points of the interval used to define E in (6),
Pr
[|ω(qT0)− ω(qT¯0)| ≥ δ ∣∣ E] ≤ −2(p− β)n
(
1− (p+ β)n
n
)2
= 2exp
(−2nδ2(1− p− β)2(p− β)).
Next, we apply the union bound to show that for 0 < ǫ < γ
Pr
[∣∣ω(qT¯0)− ω(qS0)∣∣ ≥ γ ∣∣ E] ≤ 2 exp(−2nǫ2(1− p− β)2(p− β))+ 2exp (−k(γ − ǫ)2)
By substituting p by 1− p in the expression above, we also obtain
Pr
[∣∣ω(qT¯1)− ω(qS1)∣∣ ≥ γ ∣∣ E] ≤ 2 exp(−2nǫ2(p− β)2(1− p− β))+ 2exp (−k(γ − ǫ)2)
Finally, we combine the two bounds and we get rid of the conditioning on E by adding Pr[E¯ ]. For any
δ > 0 and 0 < ǫ < δ, we may write
εδclass = max
q
Pr
[|ω(qT¯ )− 1n(|T¯0| ω(qS0) + |T¯1| ω(qS1))| ≥ δ]
= max
q
Pr
[|wt(qT¯ )− |T¯0| ω(qS0) + |T¯1| ω(qS1)| ≥ nδ]
= max
q
Pr
[|wt(qT¯ )− |T¯0| ω(qS0) + |T¯1| ω(qS1)| ≥ (|T¯0|δ + |T¯1|δ)]
≤ max
q
Pr
[∣∣ω(qT¯0)− ω(qS0)∣∣ ≥ δ]+ Pr[∣∣ω(qT¯1)− ω(qS1)∣∣ ≥ δ]
≤ 2 exp(−2nǫ2(1− p− β)2(p − β)) + 2exp(−2nǫ2(p− β)2(1− p− β))+ . . .
+ 4exp
(−k(δ − ǫ)2)+ 2exp(−2β2n)
C Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We will show that |J |ρmixWE ≥ ρWE , to be understood in that |J |ρmixWE − ρWE is positive semi-
definite. With this shown, it then follows that for any density matrix σE and for any non-negative h ∈ R
2−(h−log |J |) · IW ⊗ σE − ρWE ≥ 2−h|J | · IW ⊗ σE − |J |ρmixWE = |J |
(
2−h · IW ⊗ σE − ρmixWE
)
so that if the right-hand side is positive semi-definite then so is the left-hand side. The claimed bound
Hmin (ρWE|E) ≥ Hmin
(
ρmixWE|E
)− log |J | then follows by the definition of the min-entropy.
Writing out the measurements explicitly yields
ρWE =
∑
w∈W
(|w〉〈w| ⊗ IE)|ϕAE〉〈ϕAE |(|w〉〈w| ⊗ IE) =
∑
w∈W
∑
i,j∈J
αiα¯j |w〉〈w|i〉〈j|w〉〈w| ⊗ |ϕiE〉〈ϕjE |
and
ρmixWE =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2
∑
w∈W
|〈w|i〉|2|w〉〈w| ⊗ |ϕiE〉〈ϕiE |.
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We want to show that 〈ξ|(|J |ρmixWE − ρWE)|ξ〉 ≥ 0 for all |ξ〉 ∈ HW ⊗HE . We first consider |ξ〉 of the
special form |ξ〉 = |v〉|ψE〉 with v ∈ W , and compute/bound 〈ξ|ρWE |ξ〉 and 〈ξ|ρmixWE |ξ〉 as
〈ξ|ρWE|ξ〉 =
∑
i,j∈J
αiα¯j〈v|i〉〈j|v〉〈ψE |ϕiE〉〈ϕjE |ψE〉 =
(∑
i∈J
αi〈v|i〉〈ψE |ϕiE〉
)(∑
j∈J
α¯j〈j|v〉〈ϕjE |ψE〉
)
=
∣∣∣∑
i∈J
αi〈v|i〉〈ψE |ϕiE〉
∣∣∣2,
and
〈ξ|ρmixWE |ξ〉 =
∑
i∈J
|αi|2|〈v|i〉|2|〈ψE |ϕiE〉|2 ≥
1
|J |
∣∣∣∑
i∈J
αi〈v|i〉〈ψE |ϕiE〉
∣∣∣2 = 1|J | 〈ξ|ρWE|ξ〉,
where the inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The claim, 〈ξ|(|J |ρmixWE − ρWE)|ξ〉 ≥ 0,
for an arbitrary |ξ〉 = ∑w∈W βw|w〉|ψwE〉 ∈ HW ⊗ HE now follows by linearity, and by noting that
〈v, ψE |ρWE|v′, ψ′E〉 = 0 = 〈v, ψE |ρmixWE|v′, ψ′E〉 for all distinct v, v′ ∈ W , so that all “cross-products”
vanish.
D The Tightness of Theorem 3
We show here that in general the inequality from Theorem 3 is tight. Specifically, we specify a natural
class of sampling strategies for which Theorem 3 is an equality. Informally, this class consists of sam-
pling strategies that behave in exactly the same way if the randomized choices T and S are replaced by
fixed choices t◦ and s◦, and instead the coordinates of q are shuffled by means of a uniformly random
permutation (chosen from a subgroup of all permutations). The formal definition is given below, but let
us point out already here that Example 1 as well as the QKD sampling strategy discussed in Example 5
belong to this class. Indeed, for Example 1, instead of choosing a random subset T of size k one can
equivalently choose a fixed subset and randomly permute the positions of q. And, similarly for Exam-
ple 5, instead of choosing left or right from each pair (qi0, qi1) at random and then choosing a random
subset of size k of the selected qij’s, one can equivalently fix these choices and swap each pair (qi0, qi1)
with probability 12 and apply a random permutation to the first index.
Let Sn denote the symmetric group of degree n, i.e. the group of permutations on [n]. For any π ∈ Sn
and q = (q1, . . . , qn) ∈ An, we write πq to express that π permutes the positions of the elements of q,
i.e., πq = (qπ−1(1), . . . , qπ−1(n)). If V is a set of strings q ∈ An, then πV means that the permutation π
acts element-wise on V .
Definition 5 (G-Symmetry of a sampling strategy). Let Ψ be a sampling strategy, let G be a subgroup
of Sn, where n is the size of the population to which Ψ is applied, and let Π be a random permutation,
uniformly distributed over G. We call Ψ G-symmetric, if there exist t◦ ⊂ [n] and s◦ ∈ S such that(
ω(qT¯ ), f(T, qT , S)
) ∼ (ω((Πq)t¯◦), f(t◦, (Πq)t◦ , s◦))
where “∼” means that the pairs have the same probability distribution.
28
A direct consequence of this definition is the following relation, which we will apply later in this section.
BδT,S = {q ∈ {0, 1}n : |ω(qT¯ )− f(T, qT , S)| < δ}
∼ {q ∈ {0, 1}n : |ω((Πq)t¯◦)− f(t◦, (Πq)t◦ , s◦)| < δ} = Π−1Bδt◦,s◦.
We can now rephrase Proposition 1 and prove it.
Proposition 1 (Rephrased). For any G-symmetric sampling strategy ΨsymG and any δ > 0:
εδquant(Ψ
sym
G ) =
√
εδclass(Ψ
sym
G )
Proof. We need to show that there exists a system E and a state |ϕAE〉 such that ∆
(
ρTSAE, ρ˜TSAE
)2
=
εδclass for ρ˜TSAE that minimizes the left hand side. As pointed out after the proof of Theorem 3, the
particular construction of ρ˜TSAE used in the proof of Theorem 3 does minimize ∆
(
ρTSAE, ρ˜TSAE
)
.
Hence, it suffices to show that there exists a system E and a state |ϕAE〉 (that depends on G) such that
∆
(
ρTSAE, ρ˜TSAE
)2 (7)
=
[∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)|〈ϕAE |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉|
]2
(8)
=
∑
t,s
PTS(t, s)|〈ϕAE |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉|2 (9)= εδclass.
where ρ˜TSAE and |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉 are constructed as in the proof of Theorem 3. The derivation of equality (7)
can be found in the proof of Theorem 3. The outline of the remaining part of the proof is as follows; we
first present a candidate for |ϕAE〉 and then we show that equalities (8) and (9) do indeed hold for this
state.
We choose E to be empty. Furthermore, we define
|ϕAE〉 := 1√|G|
∑
π∈G
|πq∗〉.
where q∗ is such that Pr[q∗ /∈ BδT,S] = εδclass. It follows from the projection construction for ρ˜TSAE that
|ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉 =
1√|Ht,s|
∑
π∈Ht,s
|πq∗〉,
where Ht,s ⊆ G, i.e. Ht,s := {π ∈ G : πq∗ /∈ Bδt,s}.
To prove equality (8), we need to show that the inner product |〈ϕAE |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉| is independent of t and
s. Because |ϕAE〉 is a uniform superposition over permutations of q∗ and |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉 is a renormalized
projection of |ϕAE〉, we can easily compute this inner product, |〈ϕAE |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉| = |Ht,s|/
√|G| · |Ht,s| =√|Ht,s|/|G|. It suffices to show that |Ht,s| is independent of (t, s). It follows from the G-symmetry
that there exists a π such that Bδt,s = πBδt◦,s◦ . Furthermore, let Π be a random permutation, uniformly
distributed over G. By definition of Ht,s and because Π is uniformly distributed over G, we may write
|Ht,s| = |G| · Pr[Π q∗ /∈ Bδt,s] = |G| · Pr[q∗ /∈ Π−1πBδt◦,s◦] = |G| · Pr[q∗ /∈ Π−1Bδt◦,s◦], (10)
where the last expression is clearly independent of (t, s).
Now, let us focus on equality (9). We derived in the proof of Theorem 3 that∑t,s PTS(t, s) |〈ϕAE |ϕ˜ts⊥AE 〉|2 =∑
q PQ(q) Pr
[
q /∈BδT,S
]
, where the random variableQ is obtained by measuring subsystem A of |ϕAE〉.
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By definition of |ϕAE〉, PQ(q) > 0 only for q of the form πq∗ for some π ∈ G. Hence, to prove equality
(9), we have to show that for any π ∈ G, Pr[πq∗ /∈ BδT,S ] = εδclass. This follows directly from the
G-symmetry,
Pr[πq∗ /∈BδT,S] = Pr[πq∗ /∈Π−1Bδt◦,s◦] = Pr[q∗ /∈π−1Π−1Bδt◦,s◦] = Pr[q∗ /∈Π−1Bδt◦,s◦ ] = Pr[q∗ /∈BδT,S].
(11)
Finally, note that (10) and (11) rely on the group structure of G.
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